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RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND THE
BEGINNING OF LIFE
Belinda Bennett*
Like many other countries, Australia is increasingly being forced to face
the spiralling costs of health care. Population increases, an aging popula-
tion, and the high cost of many items of modem medical equipment and of
medical care generally, have all contributed to the pressure on health care
resources. Within this climate of resource scarcity, more and more ques-
tions are being asked about the prioritization of items of health expenditure.
The aim of this article is to consider the claim of reproductive technology,
prenatal care, and prenatal diagnosis on health care resources and to evalu-
ate the balance between treatments and preventative measures.
I. THE RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE
Many countries clearly spend considerable resources on the provision of
health care. From 1970 to 1990, Australia's total health care expenditure
averaged at 7.1% of gross domestic product; compared to 9.5% in the
United States, 7.8% in Canada, and 5.5% in the United Kingdom.' From
1982-83 to 1990-91, real total health expenditure in Australia (expressed in
1990-91 prices) increased from $A22,401 million to $A30,923 million, or by
72.4%.2 During the same period, the average annual growth rate in total
health expenditure in Australia was 4. 1%.
3
The impact of the aging of the population on health care is also significant.
It is estimated that by the year 2010, 12.8% of Australia's population will be
aged 65 years or over (an increase from 8.1% in 1950 and 10.9% in 1990),
and that by 2025 the proportion will have increased to 17.5%.' Similar in-
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1. AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, AUSTRALIA'S HEALTH 1992:
THE THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AND WELFARE
347 (1992) [hereinafter AUSTRALIA'S HEALTH 1992].
2. Id. at 339.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 299.
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creases are expected in other countries. In the United States, an estimated
13.6% of the population will be 65 or over by 2010 (up from 8.1% in 1950
and 12.6% in 1990), and will increase to 19.8% by 2025. 5 In the United
Kingdom, 15.7% will be 65 or over in 2010, rising to 19.4% in 2025, com-
pared with 10.7% in 1950 and 15.4% in 1990.6
The elderly use a "disproportionate" share of health care resources.7
More than 30% of actual hospital admissions in Australia are of persons
aged 60 years or over, representing over 50% of bed-days in hospital.' The
aging of the population in Australia and other comparable countries, and the
shift from acute to chronic diseases as the cause of death, 9 will continue to
place increased burdens on health care resources.
Advances in medical technology have also placed additional burdens on
health care resources with the development of more expensive items of medi-
cal equipment or forms of medical treatment. Artificial life-support mecha-
nisms, kidney dialysis, organ transplants such as of the heart or liver, and
the new reproductive technologies are just some of the advances contributing
to the squeeze on resources. Developments in diagnostic technologies have
also had an impact. For example, computerized tomography (CT) scanners
may cost up to $A1.5 million.' Their use has become widespread. In 1985,
Australia had 8.6 scanners for every one million people, compared with 14.7
for every one million people in the United States." Magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) is also expensive. It has been suggested that in Australia, the
use of MRI may have overall costs of $A500-600 per examination.
12
Because the cost of health care has risen, and appears likely to continue to
rise, we are faced with the increased possibility that it may be necessary to
ration health care resources. In short, allocation decisions may have to be
made that will cause some people to miss out as the health care cake is
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. As the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare notes: "For example, in Australia,
it is estimated that 38 per cent of health expenditure in 1988-89 was for those aged 65 years
and older. In June 1988, this group comprised 10.9 per cent of the population." Id. at 97. My
use of the term "disproportionate" in the text here is used in a statistical rather than a norma-
tive sense and is not intended to imply that the elderly do not deserve these health resources.
8. Id. at 127-28.
9. NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL [AUSTRALIA], DISCUS-
SION PAPER ON ETHICS AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN HEALTH CARE 2 [hereinafter
NH& MRC 1990 DISCUSSION PAPER].
10. AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, AUSTRALIA'S HEALTH 1990: THE SECOND
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF HEALTH 173 (1990) [hereinafter
AUSTRALIA'S HEALTH 1990].
11. Id. at 173-74.
12. These figures exclude interest and assume a public hospital setting. Id. at 184.
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divided."'
In one sense, there is nothing new about the need to ration health care
resources. Health care resources are never infinite. Rationing decisions are
constantly being made at levels of both macro- and micro-allocation:' 4 At
the macro level, decisions must be made about the location of health services
such as new hospitals and the location and even general availability of spe-
cialist services such as new and expensive forms of diagnostic technology.' 5
As Justice Kirby has argued:
[Miacro decisions have their ripple effect. Ultimately, they affect
the lives of ordinary people. For such people, either the tumor will
be discovered early or it will not. Either the dialysis will be made
available or it will not. Either the CT scan will be used or it will
not. Either the in vitro fertilization program will be available or it
will be denied. Either the heart or liver transplant will be ventured
or it will not.16
The making of macro-allocation decisions involves certain opportunity costs
as some services or treatments are not made available. 7
At the micro-allocation level, physicians have been the traditional "gate-
keepers" of medical resources.'" Physicians have always been gatekeepers in
some sense as they recommend "what tests, treatments, medications, opera-
tions, consultations, periods of hospitalization, or nursing homes the patient
needs."' 9 This form of gatekeeping is exercised in the patient's interests and
involves no ethical conflict for the physician.2°
In addition, health professionals have often had to make allocation deci-
13. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 Wis.
L. REv. 239, 241 (1985).
14. Beauchamp and Childress explain this distinction in the following terms:
[I]n general, macro-allocation decisions determine how much should be expended
and what kinds of goods will be made available in society, as well as how it is to be
distributed. These decisions are made by Congress, state legislatures, health organi-
zations, private foundations, and health insurance companies. Micro-allocation deci-
sions determine who will obtain available resources.
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 283
(1989).
15. Michael D. Kirby, Bioethical Decisions and Opportunity Costs, 2 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 7, 13 (1986).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 17.
18. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 23 (1986).
19. Id. at 26.
20. For a discussion of some forms of gatekeeping that may involve ethical conflicts, see,
Pellegrino, supra note 18, at 27-29. On the issue of ethical conflicts and resource allocation
see, Robert M. Veatch, Physicians and Cost Containment: The Ethical Conflict, 30
JURIMETRICS J. 461 (1990).
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sions deciding how best to allocate limited time or medicine among a
number of needy patients. Triage is one example of the rationing of health
care resources. Although it developed on the battlefield, triage, "the practice
of sorting patients according to the urgency of their needs under emergency
conditions in which such needs are likely to be urgent and medical resources
scarce,"" is regularly applied in the health care context as patients' medical
needs are classified as "immediate," "urgent," or "nonurgent.
' 22
Although there is nothing new about the rationing of health care re-
sources per se, the spiralling cost of health care, the aging population, and
population changes have all placed increased burdens on health care budgets
and focused increased attention on the rationale for decisionmaking in this
area. Indeed the bases upon which these allocation decisions are to be made,
at the levels of both macro- and micro-allocation, have been and remain the
focus of considerable attention from governmental and other bodies, 23 phi-
losophers, 24 and in legal and health care21 circles. Resource allocation in
health care is becoming one of the issues in bioethical and medico-legal
debates.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Like many recent developments in medical technology, the new reproduc-
tive technologies readily capture public attention. The success of "test-tube
baby" technology appears to confirm the image of modern medicine as capa-
ble of achieving almost anything. Yet, like many other recent developments
in medical technology, the new reproductive technologies have presented us
with dilemmas over allocation decisions about resources against the back-
drop of spiralling health care costs. Having been confronted with the fact
that it is possible to assist human reproduction artificially, we must now ask
ourselves whether we are prepared to meet the financial costs of providing
reproductive technologies to the infertile.
Treatment of Infertility
Four procedures are generally grouped under the umbrella term "new re-
21. James F. Childress, Triage in Neonatal Intensive Care: The Limitations of a Meta-
phor, 69 VA. L. REV. 547, 548 (1983).
22. Id. at 550.
23. See e.g., NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUSTRALIA DiS-
CUSSION PAPER ON THE ETHICS OF LIMITING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1988).
24. See e.g., J. GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES at ch.16 (1977);
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 14, at 283-306.
25. See, e.g., Symposium, Rationing Health Care: Social, Political and Legal Perspectives,
18 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1992); Symposium, The Law and Policy of Health Care Rationing.,
Models & Accountability (1992) 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1505 (1992).
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productive technologies:" donor insemination (DI), in-vitro fertilization
(IVF), embryo transfer (ET), and gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT).
Although other technological developments such as sex selection,
ectogenesis, or genetic engineering may also be considered by some to be
reproductive technologies, they will not be so considered for the purposes of
this discussion.
Donor insemination may be achieved in one of several ways. Donated
gametes (sperm) may be introduced into either the cervical canal or the
uterus of the recipient woman in the procedure known as artificial insemina-
tion, or artificial insemination by donor.26
With IVF, the actual fertilization of the human egg takes place outside the
human body. In this procedure, eggs (oocytes) are collected from the body
of a woman either with the assistance of laparoscopy or with the use of ultra-
sound. Once removed, the eggs are then mixed with sperm in order to
achieve fertilization. If normal cell division and early development follows,
the embryos will be placed in the woman's uterus in a procedure known as
embryo transfer.27
GIFT uses the same techniques for collection of sperm and eggs as for
IVF. Unlike IVF, however, GIFT fertilization does not take place outside
the woman's body. Rather the sperm and eggs are introduced into the wo-
man's fallopian tubes in order to allow fertilization to occur naturally.28
The Success and Cost of Treatment
Although accurate determinations of rates of infertility are difficult to es-
tablish, it is generally estimated that 10% of couples are infertile.29 In 1990,
in Australia and New Zealand, of 7153 IVF treatment cycles, 10.1% re-
sulted in live births; of 2783 GIFT treatment cycles a live birth rate of
20.8% resulted. 30 An estimated 5000-6000 donor inseminations are per-
formed annually in Australia. An estimated 6-10% per cycle result in a live
birth.31
In 1987, the estimated cost of IVF for 5000 infertile couples in Australia
was $A30 million: $A17 million paid by the Federal Government, $A6 mil-
26. NATIONAL BIOETHICS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: FINAL REPORT FOR THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH MINISTERS' CONFERENCE 10
(March 1991) [hereinafter ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY] (background paper for
Australia Health Ethics Committee).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 7-8.
30. AIHW NATIONAL PERINATAL STATISTICS UNIT, ASSISTED CONCEPTION: AUSTRA-
LIA AND NEW ZEALAND 1990 4, 6 (1992).
31. ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 26, at 14.
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lion by patients, and $A7 million by health insurance funds.32 The cost of
each IVF baby was put at about $A40 THOUSAND. 33 In the United
States, the cost of IVF has been put at $3500-5000 per attempt.34
Clearly, IVF is an expensive form of medical treatment with what some
may claim are relatively low success rates. Yet, the use of IVF as a means of
alleviating infertility appears to have met with community acceptance. In
the words of the Australian Federal Minister for Community Services and
Health: "While these technologies are still developing, they are no longer
purely experimental but are accepted medical procedures for the alleviation
of infertility."" Even with such community acceptance, however, reproduc-
tive technology is not immune from the broader debates over resource allo-
cation taking place in health care, which demand that the rationale of
allocation decisionmaking be made explicit. Even if we accept at a general
level that IVF and related techniques are worth providing, it will be neces-
sary to consider the bases upon which access will be granted and the best
possible means of ensuring that justice will be achieved.36
Value for Money?
Given the expense of the treatment, its apparently low success rate,37 and
the climate of resource scarcity, it is necessary to ask whether the new repro-
ductive technologies give value for the money. Of course, the answer de-
pends upon our criteria for measuring success;38 but, for many infertile
people, some chance of having a baby may be much better than no chance at
all. 39 The issue of whether IVF gives value for the money has been framed
by some writers in terms of a comparison between funding of research into
reproductive technology and research into the causes of infertility and/or
preventative health care measures:
In 1988, of the $[A]37 million dispensed by the Medical Research
Endowment Fund of the National Health and Medical Research
Council, $[A]1.84 million went to genetic engineering and geneti-
32. MAX CHARLESWORTH, DISTRIBUTING HEALTH CARE RESOURCES: ETHICAL AS-
SUMPTIONS 40 (Background Paper For Australian Health Ethics Committee Seminar) [herein-
after DISTRIBUTING HEALTH CARE RESOURCES].
33. Id.
34. Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Wo-
men, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S.
35. ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 26, at 1; DISTRIBUTING
HEALTH CARE RESOURCES, supra note 32, at 40.
36. See ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 26, for a discussion of
these issues.
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for IVF and GIFT success rates.
38. DISTRIBUTING HEALTH CARE RESOURCES, supra note 32, at 39.
39. Id.
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cally related research; community health research was allocated
about $[A]160,805. IVF-related research received $[A]433,659
while no money was given to research into the prevention of infer-
tility. Breast cancer, the single biggest cause of death in Australian
women, received $[A]42,923 in research funds and cervical cancer
$[A]232,131.40
That "prevention is better than cure" is just as true for infertility as for
other areas of health care. In the long run, preventative measures will un-
doubtedly be more cost-effective than treatment. Yet it does not necessarily
follow that funding should be directed towards research on preventing infer-
tility, to the exclusion of IVF-and related research. It is important for funds
to be spent on both infertility research and infertility treatments (such as
IVF), for only when both are funded will the health needs of society be met.
As the authors of Tomorrow's Child argue, preventative measures will not
assist those who are already infertile.
... [H]owever much was spent on prevention, there would still be
some people who would seek infertility treatment. We do not feel
it would be appropriate to offer them nothing. We therefore think
that there should be some provision of infertility treatment, includ-
ing reproductive technologies. It is also important that some re-
search continues in these areas, because they may have spin-offs
which can help far more people.4 1
Some feminists have been critical of the new reproductive technologies,
claiming pronatalist social pressures leave infertile women little choice but to
use the technologies; 42 that the women are exploited and depersonalized
through the use of the technologies,4 3 their bodies fragmented into a variety
of reproductive components;44 and that the technologies pose a real threat to
40. ROBYN ROWLAND, LIVING LABORATORIES: WOMAN AND REPRODUCTIVE TECH-
NOLOGIES 225 (1992). See also L. HEPBURN, OVA-DOSE? AUSTRALIAN WOMEN AND THE
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 108-10 (further detailing the funding of women's health
issues in Australia).
41. LYNDA BIRKE ET AL., TOMORROW'S CHILD: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN
THE 90s 303 (1990).
42. Robyn Rowland argues:
In reproductive technology the 'choice' presented to infertile women is either to live
the life of the infertile with all the social stigma and negativity which is currently
attached to that, OR to undergo abusive, violent and dangerous procedures in the
attempt to have a child.
ROWLAND, supra note 40, at 279.
43. Deborah L. Steinberg, The Depersonalization of Women Through the Administration
of 'In Vitro Fertilization, in THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 74 (Maureen McNeil,
et al. eds., 1990).
44. Id. See also the collection of essays in MAN-MADE WOMEN: HOW NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES AFFECT WOMEN (Gena Corea et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter MAN-MADE
WOMEN]; TEST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? (Rita Arditti, et al. eds.,
19931
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the continued role of women in the reproductive process.45
Although it is important for us to be aware of the impact of the new repro-
ductive technologies on all women, and to endeavor to minimize any adverse
consequences, the provision of reproductive technology as an infertility
treatment also responds to the needs of women: infertile women. The valid-
ity of reproductive technology's claim to a share of health resources should,
therefore, be recognized. In Australia, this was recognized by the former
National Bioethics Consultative Committee when it concluded "that infertil-
ity is a serious disability and that the alleviation of its effects by the various
forms of reproductive technology should be supported by public health care
resources in the same way as other medical (surgical, hormonal[,] etc.) treat-
ment for infertility.' '4 6 In short, the issue is not whether funding should be
directed to preventative measures or to reproductive technology. Both de-
serve funding and, given that prevention should be regarded as at least as
important as treatment, they should be regarded as equally important in
terms of funding priorities.
III. PRENATAL CARE
There is no doubt that funding of prenatal care must always be a priority
in the funding of health care. There is ample evidence to show that good
prenatal care is an important element in good neonatal outcomes.47 Lack of
prenatal care and delivery services may lead to low birth weight and an in-
creased risk of death in the child's first year.4 Women of color and of low
income appear to suffer disproportionately from inadequate prenatal care.49
Financial and other barriers may hinder access to prenatal services.5° The
provision of prenatal care and other services is important to resource alloca-
tion for it allows for more efficient targeting of expensive treatments.
A change in focus from end-stage high-tech procedures aimed at
individuals to broadly aimed basic prenatal care programs will
make existing resources go further. When good prenatal care and
1984) [hereinafter TEST-TUBE WOMEN] for feminist critiques of the new reproductive
technologies.
45. Renate Klein, What's 'new' about the 'new' reproductive technologies", in MAN-MADE
WOMEN, supra note 44, at 64, 70.
46. ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 26, at 40.
47. McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing
Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 293-94
(1987-88).
48. Id.
49. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies.- Women of Color,
Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1446-47 (1991).
50. McNulty, supra note 47, at 298.
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other health and social interventions are not available, the results
are more difficult deliveries and more low-birth-weight babies
needing expensive technologies. With fewer pregnancy complica-
tions, it should be easier to arrange for all those who need high-
tech services to get them.5 1
Of course, it may be necessary to formulate prenatal services with particular
groups in mind, such as pregnant drug addicts whose situation demands af-
fordable and accessible prenatal care and treatment designed for their
needs.5 2 The provision of such services and programs will probably be ex-
pensive. However, as Wendy Chavkin points out, "they will be far less
costly than hospital-based treatment of obstetric and neonatal complications
of perinatal drug use, and hospital or foster-based custodial care of the
children."53
IV. PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS
Many pregnant women will undergo some form of prenatal diagnosis dur-
ing their pregnancy. For most, the testing may be no more than an ultra-
sound to confirm gestational age or detect multiple births. For women at
risk of giving birth to a child with congenital or genetic disabilities, the avail-
ability of prenatal diagnosis takes on a much greater significance. Those at
risk include women of "advanced" maternal age (generally regarded to be 35
years or over), women who have had a previous pregnancy resulting in the
birth of a child with a chromosomal abnormality (for example, Down's syn-
drome) or neural tube defects, or women who have a family history of chro-
mosomal or genetic disorders.54 There is a marked correlation between
maternal age and the risk of giving birth to a child with a chromosomal
disorder. At age 20, the risk of giving birth to a child with Down's syn-
drome is 1:1,667; by age 35 the risk has increased to 1:385; and by age 45 the
risk is as high as 1:30. Similarly, the total risk of giving birth to a child with
chromosomal disorder increases dramatically with maternal age. At age 20
the risk is 1:526; at age 35 it is 1:192; by age 45 is 1:21."5
51. Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 34, at 40.
52. Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 483, 486 (1990); McNulty, supra note 47, at 301-02; Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs,
Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnancy Women Who Use Drugs, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 505, 511-12, 546-47 (1992).
53. Chavkin, supra note 5, at 486.
54. NEW SOUTH WALES GENETICS SERVICE EDUCATION PROGRAM, PRENATAL DIAG-
NOSIS: SPECIAL TESTS FOR YOUR BABY DURING PREGNANCY - CHORIONIC VILLUS SAM-
PLING (CVS) AND SPECIAL TESTS 8 (1991) [hereinafter SPECIAL TESTS].
55. SHERMAN ELIAS & GEORGE J. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW
85 (1987).
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A number of procedures are available that enable prenatal diagnosis of a
large number of genetic, metabolic, or congenital conditions. The available
procedures include ultrasound, amniocentesis, chorionic villi sampling
(CVS), fetoscopy, and alpha-fetoprotein testing.
5 6
Ultrasound is a visual diagnostic tool, often used in conjunction with
other tests. The reflection of ultrasound waves from the fetal body enables
an image of the fetus to be projected onto a monitor, either as a static image
or in "real time," which permits fetal movement to be observed." Ultra-
sound imaging may be used to confirm gestational age, detect multiple
pregnancies, and to detect certain conditions including neural tube defects
and cleft palate. Ultrasound may also permit fetal sex identification.5"
Amniocentesis is usually performed at fourteen to eighteen weeks' gesta-
tion. The test involves removal of a small amount of amniotic fluid from the
amniotic sac surrounding the fetus through a hollow needle inserted through
the woman's abdomen. It is generally three to four weeks before the test
results are available, as the fetal cells contained in the fluid must be culti-
vated prior to testing. Amniocentesis is usually accompanied by ultrasound
imaging, which enables accurate location of the placenta, fetus and amniotic
fluid.59 The risk of serious maternal complications or fetal injury associated
with amniocentesis is very low." The risk of miscarriage associated with
amniocentesis is approximately 0.5%.
61
One major difficulty associated with amniocentesis is that it cannot be per-
formed before fourteen weeks gestation. Allowing three to four weeks for
the availability of test results, a woman who wishes to have an abortion fol-
lowing prenatal diagnosis of future disability must have her abortion during
a relatively advanced stage of her pregnancy. In contrast, chorionic villus
sampling (CVS) can be performed between nine and twelve weeks' gestation,
thus allowing the possibility of a first-trimester abortion if a disability is de-
tected.62 CVS involves testing of the chorionic villi, or placental tissue,
which have the same genetic information as the fetus. The removal of the
villi may be achieved through one or two means: either the insertion of a
hollow tube through the vagina and cervix into the uterus, or by means of a
hollow tube through the abdominal wall. In both cases ultrasound is used as
56. Bernard Dickens, Abortion, Amniocentesis and the Law, 34 AM. J. COM. L. 249
(1986).
57. Id. at 251.
58. Abby Lippman, Access to Prenatal Screening Services: Who Decides?, 1 CANADIAN J.
WOMEN & L. 434, 436 (1986).
59. ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 55, at 122; SPECIAL TESTS, supra note, 54 at 9.
60. ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 55, at 129.
61. SPECIAL TESTS, supra note 54, at 11.
62. Lippman, supra note 58, at 436.
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a means of guidance.6 3 The miscarriage rate associated with CVS is approxi-
mately 2% 6 and as such is much higher than that of amniocentesis.
Fetoscopy, like ultrasound, is a visual diagnostic tool. However, unlike
ultrasound, which presents a picture of the fetus from outside the womb, the
image presented by fetoscopy is from inside the womb. Fetoscopy involves
the insertion of an endoscope, a hollow needle with a viewing device on the
end, into the amniotic sac. By allowing the fetus to be seen in utero, fetos-
copy permits diagnosis of observable disabilities such as cleft lip.65 In addi-
tion, biopsies of fetal skin or fetal blood testing may be performed,
permitting further testing. The procedure may be of limited use since it has
a miscarriage rate of 3 to 5%.66 Finally, screening of maternal blood for
alpha-fetoprotein (AFP) enables identification of women whose fetuses are
more likely to suffer neural tube defects. Affected women may then undergo
further testing in order to determine whether the fetus is affected.
The availability and use of prenatal diagnostic technologies provides wo-
men with technologies of both reassurance and prevention:67 they are reas-
sured that their pregnancy is proceeding normally and that there are no
signs of disability in the developing fetus or, if there are indications of disa-
bility, they may consider terminating the pregnancy. 6' Lippman argues that
prenatal testing is justified in terms of women's needs and that it is impor-
tant for us to assess the manner in which those needs are socially con-
structed: through the allocation of responsibility for the health of the child
to the pregnant woman;69 by the fact that the technology provides "external
verification" that everything is alright;7° by labelling women of a certain age
group as being "at risk" of having a child with disabilities;7 ' by the fact that
as prenatal diagnosis becomes increasingly routine for "older" women, the
disabilities it seeks to diagnose appear more threatening;7 2 and prenatal diag-
nosis answers the "public health 'need' to reduce unacceptably high levels of
63. SPECIAL TESTS, supra note 54, at 3-5.
64. Id. at 6.
65. Dickens, supra note 56, at 252.
66. ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 55, at 140.
67. Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and
Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J. L. & MED. 15, 22 (1991). Lippman argues that there are two
models of prenatal diagnosis is presented as a way to reduce the frequency of selected birth
defects. "In the other,... the 'reproductive autonomy' model, prenatal diagnosis is presented
as a means of giving women information to expand their reproductive choices." Id. (footnote
omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 27-28.
70. Id. at 29.
71. Id. at 29-30.
72. Id. at 30-31.
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perinatal mortality and morbidity associated with perceived increases in 'ge-
netic' disorders.",
73
So, where does prenatal diagnosis fit into the debate over resource alloca-
tion? Even accepting that perceived needs for prenatal diagnosis may be
socially constructed as Lippman argues, and acknowledging the disquiet that
some have expressed over the implications of prenatal diagnosis for people
with disabilities,74 it seems clear that prenatal diagnostic services should be
available. 75 However, it is vital to ensure that adequate funds are available
to publicize the existence and availability of the services so that women
know they exist.76 It is also vital to provide comprehensive counselling on
genetics and disabilities in order to ensue that prospective parents, faced
with a diagnosis of a future disability, will have sufficient, accurate informa-
tion upon which to base their decisions. 7
Effective counselling can assist prospective parents faced with a positive
prenatal diagnosis to come to terms with both the medical and the social
implications of the particular disability. Public understandings of disability
are imperfect. In part, the lack of understanding about disability is due to a
lack of comprehension about its lived realities. It is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for able-bodied individuals to comprehend life with a disability.
Walking around with one's eyes closed cannot even begin to approximate the
realties of blindness because the person with sight always retains the ability
to pen his/her eyes in the event of danger (e.g. the risk of falling), if he/she
wishes to read the newspaper, or if the "game" simply becomes boring. Sim-
ilarly, spending a day in a wheelchair does not mirror the experience of pa-
ralysis because the able-bodied individual always retains the ability to stand
up. In general, those without disabilities cannot accurately imagine the real-
ity of life with a disability, in either its highs or its lows.
The difficulty of comprehension is not the only barrier to understanding.
Many able-bodied individuals may not wish to confront disability even at the
level of attempting to imagine a life with a disability. They may feel a sense
73. Id. at 31.
74. Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS
FOR THE 1990s, supra note 34, at 69; Anne Finger, Claiming All of Our Bodies: Reproductive
Rights and Disability, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN, supra note 44, at 28 1; Saxton, Born and Unborn:
The Implications of Reproductive Technologies for People With Disabilities, in TEST-TUBE WO-
MEN, supra note 44, at 298.
75. As the authors of Tomorrow's Child argue: "If prenatal diagnosis were to be banned
altogether, then some women, who might have chosen not to, will be dedicating their lives to
the care of their handicapped children and some children, who might otherwise not have been
born, will lead short and painful lives." BIRKE, supra note 41, at 291.
76. Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 34, at 33.
77. See Asch, supra note 74, at 90; BIRKE, supra note 41, at 292-93.
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of uneasiness, fear, or even aversion when confronted with disability.78
There may be a fear of those who look different, or a fear of the disability
itself.79 Able-bodied people may feel distinctly uncomfortable around those
with disabilities due to the fear of being similarly disabled. 0 In addition,
people with disabilities may make limiting assumptions about disability,
such as the assumption that it is the individual's physical impairment rather
than socially and environmentally imposed constraints that create difficul-
ties;81 the construction of the person with disabilities as a victim; 2 the as-
sumption that the individual defines himself or herself primarily in terms of
their disability rather than in terms of other factors such as occupation, race,
gender, or class; 3 and finally, the assumption that hose with disabilities are
helpless or incompetent and in need of social services and support.8 4 These
assumptions form an image of a limited life of an individual who is helpless
and a victim of his or her disabilities. It is an image that may be vastly at
odds with the self-image of those with disabilities. Some or all of these as-
sumptions may affect the perceptions of prospective parents concerning the
quality of life of a future child with a disability.
Effective counselling can therefore provide prospective parents with suffi-
cient accurate information about the particular disability so they can make
informed choices and decisions. Yet in order to be really effective, such
counselling must be non-judgmental and sensitive to cultural beliefs.8 ' In
addition, it is essential that counselling be available in community languages




As the pressures over resource allocation in health care become more
acute, the need to consider the rationale upon which rationing decisions are
made becomes more pressing. As we seek to ensure that rationing decisions
78. Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and discrimination, 44 J.
Soc. IssuEs 39, 40-41 (1988).
79. Id. at 42.
80. Id. at 42- 43. Hahn argues that "the threat of a permanent and debilitating disability,
with its resulting problems, can even outrank the fear of death, which is, after all, inevitable."
Id. at 43.
81. Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction, Dis-
crimination, and Activism 44 J. Soc. IssuEs 3, 9 (1988).
82. Id. at 10-11.
83. Id. at 12.
84. Id. at 12-13.
85. Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 34, at 34.
86. Id. at 32-33.
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are just it will be important to consider general social inequalities and the
relevance of these inequalities to the construction of health needs. The bal-
ance between preventative measures and treatment; the implications of pov-
erty, disability and cultural difference; and the rights and needs of particular
social groups, as they perceive and advocate them must all be included in the
formulation of allocation rationale. Unless these factors are taken into ac-
count, allocation decisionmaking, whether it be through legislative meas-
ures, governmental bodies, or through more informal means, will simply
reproduce rather than remedy existing health inequalities.
